Measured one at a time
Yardland lists .onion services run by real, identifiable organisations — newspapers, whistleblowing platforms, privacy projects, archives. Every address here was published by the organisation itself, and every one was checked to see whether it actually answers. Each entry shows its own evidence.
The short version, before the directory.
A yardland was a medieval English measure of land — a quarter of a hide, the acreage a team of two oxen could plough in a season. It was primarily a measure of assessment rather than area. Someone walked the ground, checked the boundaries, and wrote down what was actually there. Yardland takes its name from the measuring, not the land.
Finding a legitimate onion service is oddly hard. Search engines on the Tor network are unfiltered, so the real thing sits beside phishing clones of itself. Link lists go stale within weeks. And organisations retire onion services without updating the page that announced them, so their own documentation keeps pointing at addresses that no longer answer. A directory is only useful if someone re-checks it.
So that is all Yardland does. It does not crawl the onion web and it does not index it. For each entry it records who published the address, what kind of proof that is, and what happened when we tried to reach it.
No keyword index, no crawling, no results page. If you want to search the onion web, that is a different tool with different problems.
A list is a claim with no date on it. Every entry here carries its provenance and the result of its last liveness check.
Nobody can pay, petition or post their way in. An address is listed only if the organisation publishes it and it can be independently confirmed.
Two kinds of evidence are accepted. A third is explicitly rejected.
Their own HTTPS website tells Tor Browser that an onion version exists — either with an
Onion-Location response header, or with an equivalent <meta>
tag. This is a live assertion from the organisation itself, which makes it the strongest
signal available. It is also the only kind that cannot quietly go stale, because it is
served fresh with every visit.
The address appears somewhere on the organisation's own domain — documentation, a blog post, a support page. Still first-party, but unchecked by design: nobody updates those pages when a service is retired. Tier 2 entries are therefore always liveness-tested before they appear, and all three of Yardland's unreachable findings came from this tier or from a stale tag.
Forums, aggregators, other directories, someone's summary blog post. Not accepted, ever. An address that only exists because a third party copied it is exactly how phishing addresses get laundered into looking official.
Two labels look similar and mean opposite things. Conflating them is how a directory starts lying to people.
46 entries across 9 categories. Every address below was re-probed in a single serial pass through Tor, most recently 11 October 2026, 03:30 UTC — each entry states when it was checked and what happened. Addresses are shown as plain text and are deliberately not hyperlinked here. Clicking an onion link in an ordinary browser can leak a DNS lookup and rarely works anyway — copy the address into Tor Browser instead.
Germany's public international broadcaster; publisher-run onion edition of its news site.
Advertised with a 'www.' hostname prefix; confirmed to resolve correctly over Tor (strict 56-char validators false-positive here).
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the US-funded broadcaster aimed at countries with restricted media.
Advertised with a 'www.' hostname prefix; confirmed to resolve correctly over Tor (strict 56-char validators false-positive here).
die tageszeitung, the Berlin-based reader-owned daily newspaper; onion edition.
British daily newspaper; publisher-run onion edition of the news site.
Advertised with a 'www.' hostname prefix; confirmed to resolve correctly over Tor (strict 56-char validators false-positive here).
US government-funded international broadcaster; onion edition of its news site.
Advertised with a 'www.' hostname prefix; confirmed to resolve correctly over Tor (strict 56-char validators false-positive here).
Open-source investigations outlet that identifies people, weapons and events from public data.
ADVERTISED-BUT-UNREACHABLE: the organisation still serves this address, but Tor cannot reach the service. Report upstream.
US non-profit investigative newsroom; this address is the news site itself.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
Aftenposten is Norway's largest subscription newspaper. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
Aftonbladet is a Swedish tabloid daily. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
The Associated Press is the US non-profit news agency whose copy feeds much of the world's press. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
Bloomberg News is the financial news division of Bloomberg L.P. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is Canada's public broadcaster. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
Dagbladet is a Norwegian daily newspaper. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
Der Spiegel is the Hamburg-based German news magazine. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
Forbes is a US business magazine. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
Reporters United is a Greek investigative journalism network; Greekleaks is its leak channel. A submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
NBC News is a US broadcast news network. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
The New York Times is the US daily newspaper of record. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
NRK is Norway's public broadcaster. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
ProPublica's tip line, separate from its news site address above. A submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
The open-source whistleblower submission system that newsrooms install; this is the project's own site and documentation.
Süddeutsche Zeitung is the Munich-based German daily. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
The Globe and Mail is a Canadian national newspaper. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
The Guardian's tip line, separate from its news site address above. A submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
Whistleblow.co is a commercial whistleblowing platform running an anonymous reporting channel for organisations. A submission point, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
Al Jazeera is the Qatar-based international news network. This address is its SecureDrop tip line — a submission point for documents, not a browsable site.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
The organisation behind SecureDrop and the newsroom-security training around it; this is its own site.
Swedish no-logs VPN that issues account numbers instead of email addresses and takes cash.
Tool for sending files, hosting a site or chatting directly over Tor, with no server in between.
Desktop operating system that isolates each activity in its own disposable virtual machine.
The Tor software itself: browser downloads, relay documentation and the project's own site.
Operating system split into a Tor gateway and a workstation, so an application leak cannot reach the network.
Advertised with a 'www.' hostname prefix; confirmed to resolve correctly over Tor (strict 56-char validators false-positive here).
Metadata-resistant messaging from the Open Privacy Research Society — no phone number and no central server holding the conversation.
Volunteer-run collective offering email, cloud storage, XMPP and search on free software, funded by donations.
Encrypted email, calendar, drive and VPN from Proton AG, reached here without touching the clearnet.
Activist-run email, mailing lists and VPN collectives; accounts are not tied to a phone number or a third party.
German tech collective providing mail, pads and hosting to activists and civil-society groups.
Encrypted chat, file sharing and public identity proofs, now owned by Zoom.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location. Docs pages are not updated when a service is retired, so tier-2 addresses must be liveness-gated before publication.
Search engine for onion services that filters abusive content rather than indexing everything.
Independent web index from Brave Software, built from its own crawler rather than resold results.
Paid, advertising-free search engine; admitted on its own documentation rather than an onion header.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
German non-profit meta-search from SUMA-EV, funded by memberships and donations rather than ads.
The Internet Archive's own onion: the Wayback Machine plus its text, audio and software collections, reachable without a clearnet lookup.
Free-software Android app repository: install and update apps without a Google account.
The Debian GNU/Linux distribution publish their own signed list of onion mirrors for packages and install images.
The Monero privacy-focused cryptocurrency project: wallets, documentation and downloads.
An address being here is not an endorsement. Yardland records who published an address and whether it answered. It does not vouch for what a service does, who runs it, or whether it is safe. Verify anything important out of band — ideally against a signature the organisation publishes elsewhere.
A listing is a snapshot, not a guarantee. The onion web changes daily. Every check is timestamped; treat the timestamp as the expiry on the claim.
Addresses are cryptographic. A v3 onion address is the service's public key. You cannot tell a real address from a fake one by looking — real and fake are equally random strings. That is why provenance, not appearance, is the only real defence, and it is the thing this site actually checks.